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NOTES

BRADY VIOLATIONS AND THE DUE DILIGENCE RULE
IN MONTANA
Kathryn Brautigam*

Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials
are fair; our system of the administration of justice suffers when any accused
is treated unfairly.1

I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1963, the Supreme Court of the United States established what
many consider to be “the ultimate guarantor of fairness in our criminal justice system”2 by holding that defendants have a constitutional right to the
pretrial discovery of exculpatory evidence.3 The Court’s landmark decision
in Brady v. Maryland4 occurred amidst the criminal procedure revolution of
the Warren Court. Alongside cases such as Gideon v. Wainwright5 and Miranda v. Arizona,6 Brady stood for the principle that our Constitution safeguards the rights of the accused.7 Balancing our adversarial system of jus* Kathryn M. Brautigam, Candidate for J.D. 2018, Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the
University of Montana. I wish to thank my parents for their unconditional support and encouragement
throughout my education. Special thanks to Professor Anthony Johnstone and the Montana Law Review
editors and staff for their thoughtful contributions to this note.
1. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
2. Hon. Alex Kozinski, Criminal Law 2.0, 44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. iii, xxxii (2015).
3. TIMOTHY A. SCOTT & LARRY A. BURNS, NINTH CIRCUIT CRIMINAL HANDBOOK § 4.02[1] (7th
ed. 2017).
4. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
5. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
6. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
7. Eric J. Miller, The Warren Court’s Regulatory Revolution in Criminal Procedure, 43 CONN. L.
REV. 1, 3, 14 (2010).

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2017

1

Montana Law Review, Vol. 78 [2017], Iss. 2, Art. 5
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\78-2\MON201.txt

314

unknown

Seq: 2

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

6-SEP-17

10:10

Vol. 78

tice with fundamental fairness and defendants’ due process rights, the
Brady doctrine requires prosecutors to disclose material, exculpatory evidence to defendants in criminal trials.8
In the decades since Brady, the doctrine has deviated from the Supreme Court’s original holding and is now applied inconsistently by lower
courts.9 In particular, many state courts, including Montana’s, have limited
the doctrine by invoking an extra element not considered in Brady or its
progeny.10 Known as the due diligence rule, this additional element considers whether the defendant had knowledge of or access to the evidence in
question.11
Three recent cases in Montana illustrate the due diligence rule and the
due process issues it creates. Using State v. Root,12 State v. Colvin,13 and
State v. Weisbarth14 as examples, this note will demonstrate that the due
diligence rule departs sharply from the principles underlying Brady by
shifting the burden from the government—the party with significantly more
power and responsibility—to the defendant—the party whose constitutional
rights are implicated but frequently lacks the resources necessary to defend
those same rights. Part II discusses two cases leading up to Brady, provides
an overview of Brady and its progeny, compares a traditional Brady analysis with the due diligence rule, examines the federal circuit courts of appeals’ treatment of the due diligence rule, and explores the origins of the
rule. Part III summarizes the factual and procedural background of State v.
Root, State v. Colvin, and State v. Weisbarth, concluding with a synthesis of
the three cases. Part IV argues that the due diligence rule is problematic and
should no longer be applied in Montana. First, Montana inconsistently applies the rule. Second, the rule erodes prosecutors’ disclosure obligations
under Brady. Third, the due diligence rule is fundamentally unfair to defendants. The note concludes with a suggestion for the future application of
Brady in Montana.

8. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
9. Bennett L. Gershman, Litigating Brady v. Maryland: Games Prosecutors Play, 57 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 531, 533–34 (2007).
10. See, e.g., State v. Parrish, 241 P.3d 1041, 1044 (Mont. 2010); State v. James, 237 P.3d 672, 678
(Mont. 2010).
11. Kate Weisburd, Prosecutors Hide, Defendants Seek: The Erosion of Brady Through the Defendant Due Diligence Rule, 60 UCLA L. REV. 138, 148 (2012).
12. 359 P.3d 1088 (Mont. 2015).
13. 372 P.3d 471 (Mont. 2016).
14. 378 P.3d 1195 (Mont. 2016).
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CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS

A. Pre-Brady
The Brady decision followed a line of Supreme Court cases which
established that nondisclosure of evidence by the prosecution violates due
process because it deprives “a defendant of liberty through the deliberate
deception of the court and jury . . . .”15 These cases suggested that prosecutors could no longer withhold evidence as a part of trial strategy.16 The
Court was primarily concerned with prosecutorial ethics and determining
the truth at trial.17
In Mooney v. Holohan,18 the first prosecutorial suppression case considered by the Supreme Court, the Court considered when a prosecutor’s
nondisclosure amounted to a violation of due process.19 In Mooney, the
prosecution presented perjured testimony at trial but failed to disclose evidence that would have allowed the defendant to impeach the witness who
had given perjured testimony.20 This perjured testimony was presented at
trial as part of the state’s strategy to ensure the defendant’s conviction.21
The defendant, then serving a life sentence for murder, sought federal
habeas relief on the grounds that he was denied due process by the prosecution’s knowing use of perjured testimony and suppression of evidence that
would have impeached that testimony.22
Convinced by the defendant’s due process argument, the Court held
that a criminal conviction secured by a prosecutor’s knowing use of perjured testimony results in a denial of due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.23 The Court explained the importance of due process,
stating that it is rooted in fundamental concepts of justice and protects citi15. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935); Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 216 (1942).
16. David E. Singleton, Brady Violations: An In-Depth Look at “Higher Standard” Sanctions for a
High-Standard Profession, 15 WYO. L. REV. 139, 139 (2015); see also United States v. Boyd, 55 F.3d
239, 241 (7th Cir. 1995) (“The gravity of the prosecutors’ misconduct . . . may support, but it can never
compel, an inference that the prosecutors resorted to improper tactics because they were justifiably
fearful that without such tactics the defendants might be acquitted.”).
17. Weisburd, supra note 11, at 145; Mooney, 294 U.S. at 112:
[Due process] is a requirement that cannot be deemed to be satisfied by mere notice and
hearing if a State has contrived a conviction through the pretense of a trial which in truth is but
used as a means of depriving a defendant of liberty through a deliberate deception of court and
jury by the presentation of testimony known to be perjured. Such a contrivance by a State to
procure the conviction and imprisonment of a defendant is as inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of justice as is the obtaining of a like result by intimidation.
18. 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935).
19. Brady, 373 U.S. at 86.
20. Mooney, 294 U.S. at 110.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 109–10.
23. Mooney, 294 U.S. at 112–13.
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zens’ liberty from government infringement.24 The Court further held that
due process cannot be satisfied when the prosecution withholds evidence of
known perjured testimony from the defense and later presents it as truthful
at trial, stating that such an action is “inconsistent with the rudimentary
demands of justice.”25
In Pyle v. Kansas,26 another pre-Brady decision that considered
prosecutorial evidence suppression, a prisoner serving a sentence for convictions of murder and robbery sought habeas relief because his imprisonment resulted from perjured testimony that was knowingly used by the
prosecution to obtain his conviction. The defendant further alleged that the
prosecution suppressed the testimony of three witnesses who were material
to his case.27 Reversing the lower court’s decision which denied the defendant relief, the Supreme Court stated that the defendant’s allegations
demonstrated he had been denied due process, and, if proven at trial, would
allow for the defendant’s release.28 The Court relied on its decision in
Mooney, reasoning that the prosecution’s use of perjured testimony and the
subsequent suppression of evidence amounted to a due process violation.29
B. Brady v. Maryland and Progeny
In Brady, relying on Mooney and Pyle, the Court established that the
suppression of evidence material to guilt or punishment violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition against action depriving a defendant of
their liberty without due process.30
In Brady, two men named Brady and Boblit were convicted of firstdegree murder committed in the perpetration of a robbery.31 In Maryland,
this crime is punishable by life imprisonment or death.32 At trial, Brady
testified that while he participated in the crime, Boblit was the one who
carried out the homicide.33
Before trial, Brady’s counsel asked the prosecutor to disclose any extrajudicial statements that Boblit had made.34 Some of these statements
24. Id. at 112 (citing Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316–17 (1926)).
25. Id. at 112.
26. 317 U.S. 213, 213–14 (1942).
27. Id. at 214.
28. Id. at 216.
29. Id.
30. Brady, 373 U.S. at 86 (citing Mooney, 294 U.S. at 112; Pyle, 317 U.S. at 215–16; U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1).
31. Brady, 373 U.S. at 84–85.
32. Id. at 85.
33. Id. at 84.
34. Id.
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were disclosed to Brady’s counsel, but the prosecution suppressed one.35
The suppressed statement contained Boblit’s confession that he, not Brady,
had committed the actual homicide.36 Brady’s counsel discovered this statement after trial, at which Brady was convicted and sentenced to death.37
After the Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed his conviction, Brady
moved for a new trial based on his discovery of Boblit’s suppressed statement.38 The court of appeals granted a retrial, holding that the suppression
of Boblit’s statement violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause.39 However, because Brady would be culpable for the charged crime
even if he had not pulled the trigger, the court restricted the new trial to the
question of punishment—whether Brady should still be sentenced to death
in light of Boblit’s confession—and not whether Brady was guilty of committing murder.40 Brady petitioned for certiorari to the Supreme Court.41
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and held in favor of Brady, stating that “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an
accused upon request42 violates due process where the evidence is material
either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of
the prosecution.”43
Giglio v. United States,44 the first Supreme Court case after Brady to
address prosecutorial disclosure, expanded the scope of a prosecutor’s disclosure obligation to include witness credibility “[w]hen the ‘reliability of a
given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence . . . .’” In
United States v. Agurs,45 the Court held that a prosecutor’s disclosure obligation still exists absent a specific request by the defendant. Although the
Court in Brady used the words “upon request”46 when discussing the prosecutor’s disclosure obligation, Agurs explicitly removed this requirement.47
The Court stated that “if the evidence is so clearly supportive of a claim of
innocence that it gives the prosecution notice of a duty to produce, that duty
should arise equally even if no request is made.”48 The Court further main35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 85.
40. Brady, 373 U.S. at 85.
41. Id.
42. The Supreme Court of the United States has subsequently held that the “upon request” language
is no longer operative. The Brady obligation is now self-executing, so the defendant does not need to
request. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106–07 (1976).
43. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
44. 405 U.S. 150, 154–55 (1972) (citing Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959)).
45. 427 U.S. at 106–07, 110–11.
46. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
47. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 106–07.
48. Id. at 107.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2017

5

Montana Law Review, Vol. 78 [2017], Iss. 2, Art. 5
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\78-2\MON201.txt

318

unknown

Seq: 6

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

6-SEP-17

10:10

Vol. 78

tained that a prudent prosecutor would err on the side of disclosure.49 Agurs
thus made a prosecutor’s disclosure obligations under Brady absolute in
that disclosure of evidence that would deprive the defendant of a fair trial
does not depend on a request by the defendant.50 In United States v. Bagley,51 the Court held that defendants do not have a general pretrial right of
discovery to all the evidence a prosecutor possesses; accordingly, prosecutors do not have to disclose their entire files to the defense, but only evidence that is favorable or prejudicial to defendants. Additionally, Bagley
expanded a prosecutor’s disclosure obligation to include impeachment evidence, which is evidence that can be used to show the unreliability of a
witness due to their bias or interest.52 In Kyles v. Whitley,53 the Court extended the Brady doctrine to evidence in the hands of state actors other than
the prosecutor, including police.
In Strickler v. Greene,54 the Supreme Court affirmed that there are
three elements of a “true” Brady violation: “The evidence at issue must be
favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is
impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either
willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.” Notably missing from these three elements of a “true” Brady violation is any suggestion
of a fourth element requiring due diligence on behalf of the defense.
More recently, in Banks v. Dretke,55 the Supreme Court rejected a
prosecutor’s argument that the defendant had a burden to discover material,
exculpatory evidence. Despite telling the defendant that all material evidence had been disclosed, the prosecution in Banks suppressed evidence
that a key witness was a paid informant and then knowingly allowed this
witness to testify falsely against the defendant at trial.56 The prosecution
argued that the defendant “should have asked to interview” witnesses who
could have furnished the exculpatory evidence suppressed by the prosecutor.57 The Court rejected this argument, stating that “defense counsel has no
‘procedural obligation to assert constitutional error on the basis of mere
suspicion that some prosecutorial misstep may have occurred.’”58
In contrast, the Court explained that when police or prosecutors suppress significant exculpatory or impeaching material in the State’s posses49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 108.
Agurs, 427 U.S. at 108.
473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985).
Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676.
514 U.S. 419, 437–38 (1995).
527 U.S. 263, 280–82 (1999).
540 U.S. 668, 695 (2004).
Id. at 674–75.
Id. at 688.
Id. at 695–96 (quoting Strickler, 527 U.S. at 286–87).
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sion, “it is ordinarily incumbent on the State to set the record straight.”59
Courts, litigants, and juries may properly assume that prosecutors have
honored their constitutional obligation to refrain from using improper methods to secure a conviction, and thus, prosecutorial concealment should attract no judicial approbation.60 Because the prosecutors had represented that
all material, exculpatory evidence had been disclosed, “[i]t was not incumbent on Banks to prove these representations false; rather, Banks was entitled to treat the prosecutors’ submissions as truthful.”61 The Court maintained that a rule declaring “‘prosecutor may hide, defendant must seek,’”
cannot be justified “in a system constitutionally bound to accord defendants
due process.”62 The Court reversed and remanded.63
C. Brady Elements and the Due Diligence Rule
The Brady decision placed a constitutional safeguard on defendants’
due process rights by allowing them to allege a Brady violation if the prosecution suppressed exculpatory evidence.64 There are three essential elements of a Brady claim, developed within Brady’s progeny, with the burden
on the defendant to prove each.65 First, the evidence must be favorable to
the defense.66 Evidence is favorable if it has exculpatory value or could
impeach a witness for the prosecution.67 Second, the evidence must have
been suppressed—whether willfully or inadvertently—by the prosecution.68
Third, the suppression of the evidence must have prejudiced the defendant,
meaning that it was material to his guilt or punishment.69 Evidence is material if it reasonably could have changed the outcome of the trial.70 Although
there is no element concerning the timing for the disclosure of Brady evidence, the Court in Agurs considered this separately, stating that prosecutors must decide what evidence to voluntarily disclose “in advance of
trial.”71 The Court also added the words “and perhaps during the course of a
trial” to clarify that new evidence discovered during trial should be voluntarily disclosed to the defense.72
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 675–76.
Id. at 696 (referencing Berger, 295 U.S. at 88; Kyles, 514 U.S. at 440).
Id. at 698.
Id. at 696.
Id. at 705–06.
Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281–82.
Id. at 281.
See Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154; Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676.
Strickler, 527 U.S. at 282.
Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433; Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281–82.
Agurs, 427 U.S. at 104; Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281–82; Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682.
Agurs, 427 U.S. at 107.
Id.
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In contrast, a court applying the due diligence rule retains the three
elements of a traditional Brady claim but additionally requires that defendants act with reasonable diligence to obtain the evidence against them.73 For
example, the Montana Supreme Court has interpreted the rule from Brady
as follows:
In order to establish a Brady violation, defendant must show (1) the State
possessed evidence favorable to the defense; (2) the defendant did not possess
the evidence nor could he have obtained it with reasonable diligence; (3) the
State suppressed the favorable evidence; and (4) had the evidence been disclosed, a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the proceedings
would have been different . . . . [N]o Brady violation exists where both parties
are aware of the existence of specific evidence and defense counsel could
uncover the evidence with reasonable diligence.74

Montana is not the only jurisdiction that applies the due diligence rule.
Many state courts and federal district courts are split on their application of
the rule, sometimes applying it, and other times not.75 Additionally, all federal circuit courts, except the Tenth Circuit and D.C. Circuit, have applied
some form of the due diligence rule.76 For example, the First, Second, and
Fifth Circuits clearly and consistently apply the rule, considering if the defendant knew or should have known of the evidence.77 The Fourth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits differ slightly in that they choose to focus only on
what information the defendant could have obtained through “reasonable
diligence.”78 The Eleventh Circuit wavers between applying the rule and
not applying it.79 The Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have applied the rule
in the past, but have since explicitly rejected it.80
Within the last year, the Court of Appeals for the First, Tenth, and
Eleventh Circuits all applied the due diligence rule in considering whether a
73. Parrish, 241 P.3d at 1044.
74. Id. (citing State v. James, 237 P.3d 672, 678 (Mont. 2010)).
75. Weisburd, supra note 11, at 153–54.
76. Id. at 153.
77. Thea Johnson, What You Should Have Known Can Hurt You: Knowledge, Access, and Brady in
the Balance, 28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 10–11 (2015).
78. Id. at 10.
79. Id. at 11.
80. See Dennis v. Sec’y, Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 834 F.3d 263, 291 (3d Cir. 2016) (“[T]he concept of
‘due diligence’ plays no role in the Brady analysis.”); Amado v. Gonzalez, 758 F.3d 1119, 1136–37 (9th
Cir. 2014) (finding that the due diligence rule “is contrary to federal law as clearly established by the
Supreme Court . . . and unsound public policy.”); United States v. Tavera, 719 F.3d 705, 711 (6th Cir.
2013):
This ‘due diligence’ defense places the burden of discovering exculpatory information on the
defendant and releases the prosecutor from the duty of disclosure. It relieves the government
of its Brady obligations. In its latest case on the issue [Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004)],
however, the Supreme Court rebuked the Court of Appeals [for the Fifth Circuit] for relying
on such a due diligence requirement to undermine the Brady rule . . . . [T]he clear holding in
Banks should have ended that practice.
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Brady violation had occurred.81 Given the rule’s ongoing application, it is
worth considering where it came from.
First, the due diligence rule likely evolved from holdings in two cases
that followed the Court’s opinion in Brady.82 In Kyles and Agurs, the Court
stated that prosecutors have a duty to disclose evidence that is “unknown to
the defense.”83 Although the Court was not defining the scope of Brady
evidence in using this phrase, lower courts interpreted the words to mean
that no Brady violation occurs if the defense “knew or should have known
about the evidence at the time of trial.”84
Second, the due diligence rule also likely morphed from other due diligence requirements within criminal law.85 For example, defendants’ due
diligence is often discussed by courts in the context of procedural default in
federal habeas proceedings.86 More specifically, the doctrine of newly discovered evidence in state and federal habeas proceedings considers a defendant’s diligence if the defendant raises claims based on new evidence.87
Although procedural default has a distinct analysis from a Brady claim,
lower courts have lifted the due diligence language from federal habeas and
applied it when considering Brady claims.88 Because many Brady claims
occur in post-conviction habeas proceedings, it is unsurprising that courts
have conflated the due diligence analysis in this way.89
On the one hand, the due diligence requirement makes sense: prosecutors should not have to make defendants’ cases for them.90 Additionally,
defendants can allege an ineffective assistance of counsel claim if their
counsel is not diligent in discovering exculpatory evidence.91 On the other
hand, the requirement subverts due process rights by not allowing defendants access to evidence that they otherwise would be entitled to under
81. See, e.g., United States v. Webb, 651 F. App’x 740, 744 (10th Cir. 2016); United States v.
McCoy, 636 F. App’x 996, 999 (11th Cir. 2016); United States v. Stein, 846 F.3d 1135, 1145–46 (11th
Cir. 2017); United States v. Therrien, 847 F.3d 9, 16 (1st Cir. 2017).
82. Weisburd, supra note 11, at 142–43.
83. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437 (“On the one side, showing that the prosecution knew of an item of
favorable evidence unknown to the defense does not amount to a Brady violation, without more.”);
Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103 (“The rule of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, arguably applies in three quite
different situations. Each involves the discovery, after trial, of information which had been known to the
prosecution but unknown to the defense.”).
84. Weisburd, supra note 11, at 143.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 151.
88. Id. at 143.
89. Id. at 151.
90. Id. at 141.
91. Id.
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Brady.92 This tension is illustrated by the Montana Supreme Court’s application of the due diligence rule in Root, Weisbarth, and Colvin.
III. MONTANA’S APPLICATION

OF THE

DUE DILIGENCE RULE

The following three cases—State v. Root, State v. Colvin, and State v.
Weisbarth—demonstrate Montana’s use of the due diligence rule. In all
three cases, the prosecution failed to disclose evidence favorable to the defendants.93 On appeal, instead of determining the defendants’ Brady claims
on the merits, the Montana Supreme Court considered whether the defendants knew or should have known of the evidence or attempted to retrieve
the evidence themselves.94
A. State v. Root
Montana resident Michael Jeffery Root was charged with attempted
deliberate homicide for the July 27, 2012 stabbing of Lawrence Lee.95 Root
was riding in a truck with Lee and a minor named S.R. when an argument
broke out.96 Lee was subsequently stabbed in the arm and neck.97 At Root’s
trial, both Lee and S.R. testified that Root stabbed Lee.98 Root testified that
S.R. stabbed Lee.99
In December 2012, before the trial began, Root filed a motion in
limine seeking to admit testimony of a police detective who had interviewed Lonnie Boyd.100 Boyd was a witness for the State and had told
police that S.R. admitted that he, not Root, had stabbed Lee.101 Although
Root had met with police and the prosecution about Boyd, they did not
inform Root what Boyd said in this statement.102 Because Root knew that
Boyd made a statement to police but did not know the content of that statement, Root sought admission of testimony of the police officer who interviewed Boyd in case Boyd was unavailable for trial.103 The State objected
to this admission on grounds of hearsay and the trial court sustained.104 The
92. Id. at 142.
93. Root, 359 P.3d at 1092; Colvin, 372 P.3d at 478–79; Weisbarth, 378 P.3d at 1200–01.
94. Root, 359 P.3d at 1093; Colvin, 372 P.3d at 475; Weisbarth, 378 P.3d at 1202.
95. Root, 359 P.3d at 1090.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1092.
101. Root, 359 P.3d at 1092.
102. Reply Brief of Appellant, State v. Root, 2015 WL 5178631 at *16 (Mont. July 17, 2015) (No.
DA 13-0667).
103. Reply Brief of Appellant, supra note 102, at *16; Root, 359 P.3d at 1093.
104. Root, 359 P.3d at 1093.
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State also responded that the defense had been given “all pertinent information” related to the statements Boyd gave police during the investigation.105
In January 2013, the State proceeded to secure Boyd as a witness for its
case against Root.106
On the last night before the final day of trial, the State provided the
defense with a DVD copy of the interview between the police and Boyd.107
On the DVD, Boyd relayed that S.R. admitted to stabbing Lee and said that
S.R. showed Boyd the knife he used in the stabbing.108 Boyd also described
S.R.’s proclivity toward violence in great detail, describing S.R. as “satanic,
sadistic” and stating that he had seen S.R. use guns and pull them on women.109
This was the first time that Root was made aware of this evidence
implicating S.R.110 Root could have used this evidence in his cross-examination of S.R. at trial to impeach S.R.’s testimony that Root had stabbed
Lee.111 But Root had already cross-examined S.R. before he knew the content of Boyd’s statement, so by the time the prosecution released the statement to Root, it was too late to be used effectively in trial.112
Given the prejudicial impact of this evidence, the morning after receiving the prosecution’s disclosure, on the final day of trial, the defense moved
the district court to dismiss the charges against Root, arguing that the late
disclosure of the interview was a Brady violation.113 The district court denied Root’s motion to dismiss on the grounds that the interview of Boyd
was cumulative evidence and that the defense knew about Boyd prior to the
disclosure of the recording: the defense knew that Boyd made a statement
to the police, and Boyd was available to testify at trial.114 Following this,
the jury convicted Root of attempted deliberate homicide.115 His appeal followed.116
The primary issue on appeal was whether the district court erred in
denying Root’s motion to dismiss based upon the State’s failure to disclose
pretrial the video statement between the police and Boyd.117 In a four-three
105.
106.
107.
0667).
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 1092–93.
Id. at 1093.
Brief of Appellee, State v. Root, 2015 WL 2159931 at *20 (Mont. April 29, 2015) (No. DA 13Reply Brief of Appellant, supra note 102, at *17, *19.
Id. at *18.
Id. at *17.
Id. at *17–20.
Root, 359 P.3d at 1093.
Id. at 1092.
Id.
Id. at 1090.
Id.
Id. at 1092.
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opinion, the divided Supreme Court found for the State, holding that no
Brady violation occurred.118
In analyzing Root’s Brady claim, the Court applied a three-pronged
Brady test, relying upon State v. Fish119 and Kyles v. Whitley.120 After finding the State’s suppression violated the first two prongs of Brady—the State
suppressed evidence favorable to Root—the Court concluded that Root
could not satisfy the third prong of Brady because Root obtained the Boyd
interview before the conclusion of the trial and was able to use the statement in his defense.121 Furthermore, Boyd testified at trial after the disclosure of his recorded statement, so the jury heard his account that S.R.
claimed he had stabbed Lee, not Root.122 Because the jury heard this exculpatory and impeachment evidence, the Court determined that the suppression of evidence did not prejudice Root.123 Even if the State had disclosed
the evidence to Root prior to trial, it was not enough to change the outcome
of the trial.124 Thus, the Court held Root failed to demonstrate “that the
impeachment value of Boyd’s recorded statement was sufficient to undermine confidence in the verdict”; therefore, the suppression of the evidence
did not prejudice Root such as to deny him a fair trial.125
Three justices dissented from the Court’s majority opinion. Justices
Cotter, McKinnon, and Shea disagreed that the district court had not erred
in denying Root’s motion to dismiss based upon the State’s failure to disclose the Boyd interview to the defense prior to trial.126 This suppression
constituted a Brady violation which resulted in an unfair trial.127 Applying
the same three-pronged Brady analysis as the majority, the dissent reached
the same conclusion on elements one and two, but departed from the majority as to element three, finding that the suppressed evidence prejudiced
Root.128
According to the dissent, although Root was able to cross-examine
Boyd about the suppressed interview on day three of trial, the State’s suppression of the evidence “completely deprived” Root of the opportunity to
use Boyd’s interview to undermine the jury’s confidence in S.R. during the
State’s presentation of its case.129 If the State had disclosed the evidence in
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 1094.
204 P.3d 681, 683 (Mont. 2009).
Id. at 1092 (citing Fish, 204 P.3d at 683; Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435, 437).
Root, 359 P.3d at 1093–94.
Id. at 1092.
Id. at 1094.
Id.
Id.
Id. (Cotter, J., with McKinnon and Shea, JJ., dissenting).
Id. at 1094–95.
Id. at 1094.
Id.
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a timely manner, Root could have used the evidence to impeach S.R. at the
outset of the trial, effectively undermining S.R.’s credibility, which was
central to the State’s case.130 Root could have used the evidence to show
that S.R. was the one who committed the stabbing by demonstrating that
S.R.’s testimony at trial contradicted what he told Boyd about the stabbing,
that S.R. had knowledge of where the weapon was hidden, and that S.R.
had violent tendencies.131 Instead, by the time Root received the evidence,
S.R. had been permanently released from his subpoena according to the
State’s request, so Root could not use the content of the evidence to cross
examine or impeach S.R. on the stand.132
The dissent disagreed with the majority’s reasoning that Root could
have used the evidence in his defense on the last day of trial or that Root
could have uncovered the contents of the evidence himself before the last
day of trial—“Root’s inability to present his most persuasive case is not his
fault; the fall lies clearly with the State.”133 The dissent explicitly rejected
the due diligence rule, stating that ‘“[t]he prosecutor’s obligation
under Brady is not excused by a defense counsel’s failure to exercise diligence with respect to suppressed evidence.”’134
The dissent concluded that had the suppressed evidence been properly
disclosed, there was a possibility that the result of the trial could have been
different because the evidence could have been used to undermine the
jury’s confidence in the State’s star witness.135 As a result, Root did not
receive a fair trial.136
B. State v. Colvin
Daniel Joseph Colvin was charged with attempted deliberate homicide
on October 9, 2014, for the shooting of Michael Aja.137 The incident occurred in Aja’s Jeep, where Colvin claimed to have been holding the pistol
inside the driver’s side window. According to Colvin, the pistol accidentally misfired and hit Aja.138 Aja’s blood was spattered on the inside of the
Jeep.139 On the same day that the shooting occurred, the police collected
and impounded the Jeep as evidence.140 Both the prosecution and defense
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 1095.
Reply Brief of Appellant, supra note 102, at **17–18.
Root, 359 P.3d at 1095 (Cotter, J., with McKinnon and Shea, JJ., dissenting).
Id.
Id. (quoting Amado, 758 F.3d at 1135).
Id. at 1095.
Id.
Colvin, 372 P.3d at 472.
Id.
Id. at 474–75.
Id. at 472.
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based their cases on the position of the pistol and its distance from Aja
when fired.141 The blood spattering on the inside of the Jeep became the
crucial evidence in the case.142
The State’s theory was that the pistol was shot from several feet
outside the vehicle, while Colvin contended that the shot came from very
near the window or inside of it.143 Colvin also argued that each eyewitness
to the shooting, including Aja, supported his theory that the pistol was fired
from very near the window or inside of it.144
On October 9, 2014, the same day the State charged Colvin, Colvin’s
attorney filed a motion for discovery.145 Among other things, the motion
specifically included the Jeep in which Aja was shot and “all material exculpatory or inculpatory of the defendant.”146 Obtaining the Jeep was key to
Colvin’s defense, because he believed it contained essential evidence such
as Aja’s blood spatter and the gunshot residue from the pistol.147 On October 14, the district court entered an order granting the defense’s motion,
requiring the State to disclose “all materials known or discovered . . . pertinent to this case.”148 Despite this order, on November 9, 2014, the State
returned the vehicle to Aja without notifying the defense or the district
court.149
On November 21, 2014, the defense still had not learned of the vehicle’s release and subsequently filed a motion to compel, which the district
court granted.150 Nearly three weeks later, the State finally notified the defense that the Jeep had been returned to Aja over a month earlier.151 On
February 26, 2015, Colvin moved to dismiss the charges against him on the
basis that the State had failed to preserve the vehicle.152 The district court
granted Colvin’s motion to dismiss based on Brady.153 According to the
district court, the State’s release of the vehicle was “‘negligent’” and a
“‘fundamental violation of due process’” because Colvin was deprived “‘of

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 472, 474–75.
at 472.

at 472–73.
at 473.
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the opportunity to investigate and prove [his] theory of the case.’”154 The
State appealed.155
On appeal, the issue was whether Colvin’s charges were correctly dismissed based on the State’s failure to preserve the vehicle.156 The Court
unanimously held in favor of Colvin, dismissing the charge.157 After analyzing the first two elements of a traditional Brady analysis and finding
them fulfilled, the Court then considered Colvin’s motion for discovery
within the third element of Brady, whether or not the evidence prejudiced
Colvin.158
Without saying as much, this is where the Court analyzed the due diligence rule. If Colvin had not moved for discovery, it is questionable
whether the Court would have found that the State’s suppression prejudiced
Colvin. This is because, according to the logic of the due diligence rule, if a
defendant knew of evidence—but did not try to gain access to it—then the
suppression of it could not have prejudiced him at trial.159 But because Colvin performed due diligence to obtain the evidence himself and the State
still suppressed it, the Brady claim was successful, and the charges were
dismissed.160
C. State v. Weisbarth
David Weisbarth was charged with felony incest on February 7, 2013,
for events occurring sometime between October 23, 2012, and December
13, 2012, when his five-year-old biological daughter, T.W., came to visit
him.161 Soon after this visit with her father, T.W. informed police that
Weisbarth had sexually abused her.162 Prior to this allegation, T.W. had
been diagnosed with reactive attachment disorder, which has a tendency to
affect a child’s propensity for truthfulness.163 T.W. sought treatment for the
disorder from various medical professionals, including a neuropsychologist
and a child psychologist.164 Weisbarth filed a motion to compel the State to
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id.
Notice of Appeal, June 22, 2015, DA 15-0373.
Colvin, 372 P.3d at 473.
Id. at 476.
Id. at 475.
Weisburd, supra note 11, at 155–56.
Colvin, 372 P.3d at 476.
Weisbarth, 378 P.3d at 1197.
Id. at 1196–97.
Id. at 1197.
Id.
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produce these medical records, which was granted.165 The district court ordered the State to disclose the medical records directly to Weisbarth.166
On May 15, 2014, four days before trial, the State moved for an in
camera review of T.W.’s medical records.167 The State argued that the
medical records could not be released to the defense without the district
court first reviewing them because T.W.’s privacy rights had been implicated.168 Although the medical records contained exculpatory evidence and
were thus relevant to Weisbarth’s defense, the State did not release this
evidence to Weisbarth.169 Instead, the State maintained that the evidence in
T.W.’s medical records was not discoverable.
On May 16, 2014, the State moved to seal the medical records and
argued that an in camera inspection was not possible because the trial was
three days away.170 Due to T.W.’s privacy interests, the State released a
heavily redacted copy of the medical records containing only one sentence
from a three-page report written by T.W.’s neuropsychologist.171 The sentence that the defense was provided with stated, “We will go slowly with
differential diagnoses; but at this time, I am convinced this young girl has
reactive attachment disorder most likely based on early neglect or even possible abuse.”172 The district court sealed the records without reviewing
them in chambers.173 The State still had not informed the defense or the
court that the medical records contained exculpatory evidence.174
At trial, the only direct evidence against Weisbarth was T.W.’s testimony.175 Weisbarth had an expert witness testify that reactive attachment
disorder manifests itself in behavioral issues such as lying.176 The State
attacked the witness’s credibility and maintained there was little basis to
conclude that T.W.’s reactive detachment disorder caused her to lie about
being sexually assaulted.177 The jury subsequently found Weisbarth guilty
of felony incest.178
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1198.
Id.
Id.
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After the trial, Weisbarth gained access to T.W.’s sealed medical
records.179 The records stated that T.W. suffered from psychosis; that her
disorder demonstrated itself through lying; that her living situation with her
grandparents was unstable at the time of the alleged sexual assault, possibly
exacerbating her symptoms; that her grandfather reduced her medication
below the recommended dosage around the time the alleged assault occurred; and that T.W. had possibly made a previous allegation of sexual
abuse against her mother and later recanted it.180 Because this evidence was
exculpatory and suppressed by the State, Weisbarth appealed, alleging a
Brady violation.181
On appeal the issue was whether Weisbarth was entitled to a new trial
based on the State’s failure to disclose TW’s medical records.182 The unanimous Court held in favor of Weisbarth.183 The Court began by explaining
the State’s obligation under Brady and the three elements of a Brady violation.184 Immediately thereafter, the Court explicitly invoked the due diligence rule, stating, “We have further explained that even if the foregoing
elements are satisfied, there is no Brady violation if the petitioner could
have obtained the exculpatory evidence with reasonable diligence.”185
The Court found that Brady applied to the medical records because
they impugned T.W.’s credibility and “had substantial value to the defense
given its potential to lead directly to admissible exculpatory evidence.”186
After finding all three elements of a traditional Brady analysis fulfilled, the Court turned to the due diligence rule, conceding that it is “now
seemingly at odds” with Ninth Circuit precedent.187 Despite this, the Court
declined “to address the apparent conflict or revisit [its] previous decisions”
invoking the due diligence rule, deeming it “unnecessary to do so” because
“Weibarth exercised reasonable diligence in this instance.”188 Concluding
its due diligence analysis, the Court stated that Weisbarth had correctly exercised due diligence in moving to obtain the medical records, but the State
“thwarted those efforts.”189 The Court reversed and remanded for a new
trial so that Weisbarth could use the medical records in his defense.190
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id.
Weisbarth, 378 P.3d at 1198.
Id. at 1199.
Id.
Id. at 1203.
Id. at 1200.
Id.
Id. at 1201.
Id. at 1202.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1203.
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The most important conclusion to be drawn here is the Court’s implicit
acknowledgement that even though all three elements of the Brady test
were otherwise satisfied, Weisbarth’s Brady claim would have failed if he
had not acted with due diligence by moving to obtain the medical records.
D. The Due Diligence Rule in Root, Colvin, and Weisbarth
The Court employed an incorrect analysis in Root, Colvin, and Weisbarth by applying the due diligence rule, whether or not the rule was explicitly mentioned in the opinions. In Root, the majority found that no Brady
violation occurred because Root had knowledge of the suppressed statement
but did not exercise diligence to uncover the rest of it before the last day of
trial when the State released it.191 In Colvin, the Court found that a Brady
violation had occurred because the defense moved to obtain the Jeep.192
And in Weisbarth, the Court found that a Brady violation had occurred because the defense moved to obtain the medical records.193
According to the Court’s logic in Root, Root’s Brady claim failed because (1) Root knew of the existence of the suppressed evidence before trial
and (2) learned of the content of that evidence on the night before the last
day of trial.194 Therefore, Root could have conceivably used the evidence in
his defense on the last day of trial.195 While not stated in the opinion, this is
where the Court invoked the due diligence rule, considering that
“no Brady violation exists where both parties are aware of the existence of
specific evidence and defense counsel could uncover the evidence with reasonable diligence.”196 The Court implicitly applied the due diligence rule,
but failed to explain what it is doing or its reason for considering Root’s
knowledge of the evidence.
The Court reasoned that no Brady violation existed because Root knew
of the existence of the Boyd statement.197 The Court’s justification is
straightforward: “so long as the defendant should be aware of the [evidence], there is no [Brady] violation.”198 But the Court incorrectly assumed
that because Root had knowledge of this statement, he could have effectively used it in his defense. However, in reality, Root did not know of the
content of the Boyd statement, and Root’s attempt to uncover the evidence
with reasonable diligence by moving in limine before trial began was re191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Root, 359 P.3d at 1093.
Colvin, 372 P.3d at 472–73.
Weisbarth, 378 P.3d at 1202.
Root, 359 P.3d at 1093–94.
Id. at 1094.
Parrish, 241 P.3d at 1044.
Root, 359 P.3d at 1092, 1094.
Weisburd, supra note 11, at 156.
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jected by the trial court.199 But according to the Court’s logic, because Root
knew of the statement and learned of the contents of it on the night before
the last day of trial, he had enough time to use the statement effectively in
his defense.200
Whether or not the Court realized it was invoking the due diligence
rule here by considering Root’s knowledge, this consideration should have
had no bearing on the Court’s Brady analysis. Furthermore, Root surely
could have used the evidence more effectively if the State had disclosed it
before the last day of trial.201 Root’s verdict was unreliable because the jury
did not hear the evidence contained on the DVD until the last day of trial,
and Root could not use the new evidence to cross-examine S.R. because
S.R. had been released from his subpoena and could not be located.202 Because it is possible that the jury would have reached a different verdict had
the evidence on the DVD been disclosed earlier, the State’s suppression
prejudiced Root.203
Although the Court reached the right result in Colvin and Weisbarth, it
did so for the wrong reason by applying an incorrect analysis. The defendants in both cases had successful Brady claims because the evidence clearly
fulfilled all three elements of the Brady test,204 and the cases should have
been decided on those three elements alone. Yet the Court in both cases
went a step further and invoked the due diligence analysis, finding the
Brady claims successful because the defendants moved to obtain the evidence themselves.205 This was the same analysis the Court applied to reach
the incorrect result in Root—although the evidence in Root clearly fulfilled
all three Brady elements, the Court conflated Root’s knowledge of the evidence with the third Brady element, concluding that because Root had
knowledge of the evidence, its late disclosure could not have been prejudicial.206

199. Reply Brief of Appellant, supra note 102, at *16:
In the event this Court disagrees with Mr. Root’s argument that no reasonable diligence is
required, then Mr. Root contends his trial counsel acted with reasonable diligence in attempting to locate Boyd and by seeking admission of the limited facts known. Out of concern that
Boyd would not be available at trial, Mr. Root filed a motion in limine specifically seeking
admission of the limited facts known by Mr. Root.
200. Root, 359 P.3d at 1093–94.
201. Id. at 1094–95 (Cotter, J., with McKinnon and Shea, JJ., dissenting).
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1095.
204. Colvin, 372 P.3d at 476; Weisbarth, 378 P.3d at 1202.
205. Colvin, 372 P.3d at 472–73; Weisbarth, 378 P.3d at 1202.
206. Root, 359 P.3d at 1093.
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DUE DILIGENCE RULE

Root, Colvin, and Weisbarth demonstrate a troubling application of
Brady through the use of the due diligence rule. Although this is problematic in and of itself, it merely illustrates a trend by the Montana Supreme
Court wherein the due diligence rule is inconsistently applied. As will be
demonstrated below, the Court wavers between applying the rule and not
applying it, invoking it in some cases but not in others. And as demonstrated by Root, Colvin, and Weisbarth, the Montana Supreme Court continues to apply the rule, even though the rule has no basis in Brady or its
progeny.207 The United States Supreme Court has never adopted the due
diligence rule, nor has it hinted at its application in the context of a Brady
claim.208 Equally troubling, however, is that the due diligence rule relieves
the prosecution of their constitutional disclosure obligation under Brady and
is fundamentally unfair to defendants.
This section will explore why the Montana Supreme Court’s use of the
due diligence rule—whether express or implicit—is at odds with the constitutional principle at the heart of Brady. First, Montana inconsistently applies the rule. Second, the rule erodes prosecutors’ disclosure obligations
under Brady. Third, the due diligence rule is fundamentally unfair to defendants.
A. Montana’s Inconsistent Application of the Due Diligence Rule
While Montana has adopted the Brady doctrine both by common
law209 and by statute,210 its application of Brady has not been consistent.
The Montana Supreme Court has wavered between the application of a
three-pronged traditional Brady analysis211 and a four-pronged due diligence analysis212 in applying the Brady doctrine. For example, in a 2010
case considering a Brady violation, the Montana Supreme Court applied the
207. See infra Section II, Part B.
208. Weisburd, supra note 11, at 157; Johnson, supra note 77, at 8.
209. See, e.g., State v. Craig, 545 P.2d 649, 651–52 (Mont. 1976).
210. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46–15–322 (2015) (the State’s duty to disclose); § 46–15–327 (the State’s
ongoing duty to disclose); § 46–20–701(2)(b)–(c) (when the State’s failure to disclose results in prejudicial error at trial).
211. See, e.g., State v. Sullivan, 948 P.2d 215, 218 (Mont. 1997); State v. Kills On Top, 15 P.3d 422,
429 (Mont. 2000); State v. Thompson, 28 P.3d 1068, 1072 (Mont. 2001); Hiebert v. Cascade Cnty., 56
P.3d 848, 856 (Mont. 2002); Colvin, 372 P.3d at 474; Fish, 204 P.3d at 683; State v. St. Dennis, 244
P.3d 292, 301 (Mont. 2010).
212. See, e.g., Gollehon v. State, 986 P.2d 395, 398 (Mont. 1999); State v. Ellenburg, 8 P.3d 801,
811 (Mont. 2000); State v. DuBray, 77 P.3d 247, 260 (Mont. 2003); State v. Field, 116 P.3d 813, 816
(Mont. 2005); State v. Giddings, 208 P.3d 363, 370 (Mont. 2009); Holliday v. State, 348 P.3d 169
(Mont. 2014); McGarvey v. State, 529 P.3d 576, 583 (Mont. 2014); Seiffert, 237 P.3d at 671; James, 237
P.3d at 678; Parrish, 241 P.3d at 1044.
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traditional three-pronged Brady analysis, using the exact language from
Strickler.213 However, in two other cases from 2010, the Montana Supreme
Court applied the four-pronged Brady analysis invoking the due diligence
rule.214
This inconsistent application is a problem because in any given case
involving a Brady violation one defendant’s Brady claim may fail due to his
lack of diligence, while another defendant may be granted a re-trial or have
his charges dismissed because the Court did not expect him to discover the
suppressed evidence through reasonable diligence. Thus, the Montana Supreme Court’s inconsistent use of the due diligence rule presents an unequal
application of the law. While the Court’s use of the due diligence rule is
arguably disjointed, it is troubling that defendants must be kept guessing
about whether or not prosecutors will be held to their constitutional disclosure obligations in any given case or whether the defendants must uncover
all exculpatory evidence themselves.
B. The Due Diligence Rule Removes the Prosecutor’s Constitutional
Disclosure Obligation
As previously discussed, Brady and its progeny place a “broad duty of
disclosure”215 on prosecutors to ensure fairness in criminal trials and compliance with a defendant’s due process rights.216 This obligation stems from
“the special role played by the American prosecutor in the search for truth
in criminal trials,”217 in which prosecutors are representatives of the government.218 Because of this special role, prosecutors are required to “govern
impartially” and ensure that justice is done.219
However, the application of the due diligence rule removes a prosecutor’s constitutionally required disclosure obligation. It circumvents the
Brady doctrine as a whole, removing what may be the only mechanism
forcing disclosure of exculpatory evidence.220 This is because when the due
diligence rule is invoked, a prosecutor caught in a Brady violation can simply allege that disclosure was not needed because the defendant should have
found the evidence himself through due diligence.221 This incentivizes pros213. St. Dennis, 244 P.3d at 301; Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281–82 (“The evidence at issue must be
favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must
have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.”).
214. See, e.g., James, 237 P.3d at 678; Parrish, 241 P.3d at 1044.
215. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281.
216. Weisburd, supra note 11, at 146; Johnson supra note 77, at 5.
217. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281.
218. Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154.
219. Berger, 295 U.S. at 88.
220. Johnson, supra note 77, at 7–8; see Kozinski, supra note 2, at xxii to xxvi.
221. Weisburd, supra note 11, at 158.
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ecutors to either delay the disclosure of evidence or completely suppress
it.222
The Ninth Circuit, Sixth Circuit, and Third Circuit have rejected this
burden-shifting framework. As the courts discussed in Amado v. Gonzalez,223 United States v. Tavera,224 and Dennis v. Secretary, Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections,225 the due diligence rule allows prosecutors to
shift the burden of discovery to the defendant, thereby releasing their constitutionally mandated disclosure obligation. Even if a court determines that
the prosecution suppressed evidence favorable to the defense, the due diligence rule shifts the burden from the prosecutor to the defendant to prove
evidence of his knowledge, even when the prosecution “has ready access to
that evidence.”226 According to the Third Circuit, this shift is especially
problematic because “[s]ubjective speculation as to defense counsel’s
knowledge or access may be inaccurate, and it breathes uncertainty into an
area that should be certain and sure.”227
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit pointed out that this shifting is unfair to
defendants because prosecutors often have more resources available for discovery, so it is fitting that they are the ones obligated to disclose evidence.228 Indeed, prosecutors have a superior “investigatory apparatus” at
their disposal, including a large staff of investigators and assistant prosecutors, the cooperation of the police, access to technology such as wiretaps,
and government funding.229 In contrast, defendants do not have access to
these investigative benefits, which is one reason why Brady places an independent duty on the prosecution to assist the defendant by disclosing evidence favorable to her case.230
Furthermore, as the United States Supreme Court has explained, broad
disclosure by the prosecution is “as it should be” because it “tend[s] to
preserve the criminal trial, as distinct from the prosecutor’s private deliberations, as the chosen forum for ascertaining the truth about criminal accusations. . . . The prudence of the careful prosecutor should not therefore be
discouraged.”231 Additionally, broad disclosure will “serve to justify trust in
222. Id.
223. 758 F.3d at 1136–37.
224. 719 F.3d at 712.
225. 834 F.3d at 290.
226. Johnson, supra note 77, at 11.
227. Dennis, 834 F.3d at 293 (citing Weisburd, supra note 11, at 164 (“[P]rosecutors . . . cannot
accurately speculate about what a defendant or defense lawyer could discover through due diligence.
Prosecutors are not privy to the investigation plan or the investigative resources of any given defendant
or defense lawyer.”).
228. Amado, 758 F.3d at 1136–37.
229. Tavera, 719 F.3d at 712.
230. Id.
231. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 439–40.
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the prosecutor as ‘the representative . . . of a sovereignty . . . whose interest
. . . in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice
shall be done.’”232
Thus, prosecutors owe both ethical and professional duties to the defendants they prosecute—including the duty to disclose exculpatory evidence—with the ultimate goal being a fair trial and just outcome.233 The
due diligence rule undermines both the duty and the end goal of prosecutors.
C. The Due Diligence Rule Is Fundamentally Unfair to Defendants
Brady’s paramount concern was ensuring a fair trial for the accused.234
As the Brady Court determined, the doctrine is grounded in the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that states shall not
“deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.”235 Due process can be defined as the application of “law in its regular
course of administration, according to prescribed forms, and in accordance
with the general rules for the protection of individual rights.”236 A fair trial
is “one in which evidence subject to adversarial testing is presented to an
impartial tribunal for resolution of issues defined in advance of the proceeding.”237
For purposes of Brady, then, due process requires that material evidence favorable to a defendant be disclosed to ensure a fair trial in which
the jury is given the ability to arrive at a fair verdict by considering all
evidence that is relevant.238 But the due diligence rule undermines this goal
by keeping relevant evidence from the judge or jury, hindering their ability
to determine the truth.239 This is because “[w]hen favorable evidence is
232. Id. (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)).
233. H. Mitchell Caldwell, The Prosecutor Prince: Misconduct, Accountability, and a Modest Proposal, 63 CATH. U. L. REV. 51, 57 (2013).
234. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
235. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
236. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 521 (1884).
237. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685.
238. Cynthia E. Jones, Criminal Law: A Reason to Doubt: The Suppression of Evidence and the
Inference of Innocence, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 415, 422–23 (2010).
239. Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A Paper
Tiger, N.C.L. REV. 693, 731 (1987) (“By definition, Brady-type misconduct keeps relevant evidence
away from the judge or jury.”); see also Bagley, 473 U.S. at 702 (Marshall, J., with Brennan, J., dissenting):
The Court’s standard also encourages the prosecutor to assume the role of the jury, and to
decide whether certain evidence will make a difference. In our system of justice, that decision
properly and wholly belongs to the jury. The prosecutor, convinced of the guilt of the defendant and of the truthfulness of his witnesses, may all too easily view as irrelevant or unpersuasive evidence that draws his own judgments into question. Accordingly he will decide the
evidence need not be disclosed. But the ideally neutral trier of fact, who approaches the case
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withheld, the factfinder is handicapped in his ability to discern what actually happened.”240 If a jury cannot determine what happened due to missing
material evidence, the defendant does not receive a fair trial. This issue was
addressed in Justice Thurgood Marshall’s dissent in Bagley:
When favorable evidence is in the hands of the prosecutor but not disclosed,
the result may well be that the defendant is deprived of a fair chance before
the trier of fact, and the trier of fact is deprived of the ingredients necessary to
a fair decision. This grim reality, of course, poses a direct challenge to the
traditional model of the adversary criminal process. . . . Evidence that is of
doubtful worth in the eyes of the prosecutor could be of inestimable value to
the defense, and might make the difference to the trier of fact.241

Furthermore, the due diligence rule is fundamentally unfair to defendants because it presumes that they have knowledge of the exculpatory evidence against them and can therefore discover it. However, this is not always the case. In both Brady and Tavera, the defendants did not know that
their co-defendants had made exculpatory statements, nor could they discover these statements because they were in prison and presumably had no
access to their co-defendants.242 In both cases, the defendants did not discover the statements made by their co-defendants until after trial, once they
had been convicted.243 It is implausible to conclude that the prosecutors’
duties to disclose in both cases were relieved because Brady and Tavera
could have, or should have, uncovered their co-defendants’ exculpatory
statements while in prison.
Application of the due diligence rule creates another problem for defendants because the rule itself presents a vague and unclear standard. The
courts in jurisdictions that apply the rule often fail to explain how much
diligent discovery a defendant must undertake in order to fulfill a Brady
claim.244 Under what circumstances will a defendant’s diligence be enough
to qualify as “due diligence”? For example, is a motion by a defendant
enough to qualify as due diligence? In Colvin and Weisbarth, discovery
motions by the defense were enough to fulfill due diligence, but in Root, the
defense’s motion was not.245 Similarly, is due diligence fulfilled when a
from a wholly different perspective, is by the prosecutor’s decision denied the opportunity to
consider the evidence. The reviewing court, faced with a verdict of guilty, evidence to support
that verdict, and pressures, again understandable, to finalize criminal judgments, is in little
better position to review the withheld evidence than the prosecutor.
240. Weisburd, supra note 11, at 159.
241. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 694, 698 (Marshall, J., with Brennan, J., dissenting).
242. Brady, 373 U.S. at 84; Tavera, 719 F.3d at 710.
243. Brady, 373 U.S. at 84; Tavera, 719 F.3d at 710.
244. See, e.g., Root, 359 P.3d at 1093; Colvin, 372 P.3d at 475; Weisbarth, 378 P.3d at 1202; Gollehon, 986 P.2d at 398; Ellenburg, 8 P.3d at 811; DuBray, 77 P.3d at 260; Field, 116 P.3d at 816;
Giddings, 208 P.3d at 370; Holliday, 348 P.3d 169; McGarvey, 529 P.3d at 583; Seiffert, 237 P.3d at
671; James, 237 P.3d at 678; Parrish, 241 P.3d at 1044.
245. Root, 359 P.3d at 1092–93; Colvin, 372 P.3d at 476; Weisbarth, 378 P.3d at 1202.
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prosecutor responds to a defendant’s discovery request with a large volume
of information, thus intentionally or unintentionally causing a defendant to
believe that all exculpatory evidence was disclosed?246
The vagueness of the due diligence rule also affects the prosecutor,
who must independently evaluate both the materiality of the evidence and
whether the diligent defendant could have discovered it.247 Instead of turning over all exculpatory evidence, a prosecutor must speculate and sort out
the evidence that a defendant could have obtained on his or her own.248 But
the due diligence rule lacks any guidance or standard for the prosecutor
engaging in this investigation. Not only does this create more work for the
prosecutor and add a layer of inefficiency to criminal investigations, it also
likely results in unfairness to the defendant as it gives individual prosecutors more discretion to determine a defendant’s diligence and allows for
more justifications to withhold exculpatory evidence.249 In addition to these
problems, it is also too vague and is applied inconsistently, making it extremely difficult for both prosecutors and defendants to comply with. Defendants are more likely to receive an unfair trial as a result.
V. CONCLUSION
Writing for the majority in Brady, Justice Douglas maintained that a
suppression of material evidence favorable to the defense “violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”250 Echoed in Brady’s
progeny, many state statutes, the Rules of Professional Conduct, and American Bar Association guidelines, a prosecutor’s disclosure obligations under
Brady are well established.251 Notably absent is any requirement of due
diligence on behalf of the defendant as required by the Montana Supreme
Court.
As discussed above, the due diligence rule is problematic for a number
of reasons. Most notably, it has no basis in precedent, it has been rejected
by other courts, it unfairly burdens the defendant by shifting the prosecutor’s disclosure obligation, and it keeps relevant evidence away from the
246. Bennett L. Gershman, Litigating Brady v. Maryland: Games Prosecutors Play, 57 CASE W.
RES. 531, 558 (2007).
247. Weisburd, supra note 11, at 159.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
251. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(b) (2004) (requires that prosecutor make a
“timely disclosure”); ABA MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-103(B) (2004) (requires that
prosecutor make a timely disclosure); ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION, STANDARD 3-3.11(A) (1993) (requires disclosure
“at the earliest feasible opportunity.”).
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jury, hindering their ability to determine the truth at trial. Given the
problems associated with the due diligence rule, courts should cease to apply it. And because the due diligence rule is a judicially created exception
to the Brady doctrine, the courts are the only actors that can prevent its
application. As the Honorable Judge Kozinski of the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit concluded, only judges can put a stop to the “epidemic” of
Brady violations that continue to occur in the United States.252
All of the above issues are illustrated in Montana’s application of the
due diligence rule, which the Montana Supreme Court has been invoking
for some time.253 Root, Colvin, and Weisbarth are merely the most recent
illustrations of due diligence application in Montana. Montana can begin by
abandoning the due diligence rule altogether. The Montana Supreme Court
should analyze all future Brady claims under a three-pronged Brady analysis, omitting any consideration as to whether the defendant knew of the
evidence or could have obtained the evidence himself through reasonable
diligence.254 In doing so, the Court would ensure defendants’ due process
rights are protected by holding the State responsible for its constitutionally
mandated disclosure obligation.

252. United States v. Olson, 737 F.3d 625, 626 (9th Cir. 2013).
253. See, e.g., Johnson, 848 P.2d 496; Gollehon, 986 P.2d at 398; Ellenburg, 8 P.3d at 811; DuBray,
77 P.3d at 260; Field, 116 P.3d at 816; Giddings, 208 P.3d at 370; Holliday, 348 P.3d 169; McGarvey,
529 P.3d at 583; Seiffert, 237 P.3d at 671; James, 237 P.3d at 678; Parrish, 241 P.3d at 1044 (applying
the four-pronged Brady analysis invoking the due diligence rule).
254. See, e.g., Strickler, 527 U.S. at 280–81; Tavera, 719 F.3d at 711–12; Banks, 540 U.S. at 696;
Amado, 758 F.3d at 1119.
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